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Indonesia: A new `middle power' (by: Santo Darmosumarto)
Friday, 30 October 2009
The Jakarta Post
There has been some talk among academic circles about the coming
ascendancy of a new power in the Asia-Pacific, which has been aptly
branded KIA (Korea-Indonesia-Australia).
The argument, as voiced among others by Jonas Parello-Plesner, a
Scandinavian foreign-policy adviser, is that although undertakings of
powerhouses such as China, India, Japan and the US would continue to
dominate in the region, a new order is very much in the making, with
Korea, Indonesia and Australia playing greater roles as "middle powers".
Can Indonesia be a "middle power"? Some may smirk at this suggestion,
arguing that Indonesia is in no capacity to play such a role,
considering its problems at home, let alone its dubious recognition
abroad. Meanwhile, others may say that to aspire to become a "middle
power" is akin to aspiring for mediocrity.
However, all things considered, Indonesia's rise to international
stardom should indeed be pursued through playing the role of a "middle
power". In doing so, Indonesia would not only enhance its image as a
responsible member of the international community, but also further
strengthen its national resolve in conducting a "free and active foreign
policy".
Parello-Plesner argues that Korea, Indonesia and Australia have every
potential to play larger roles not only in the region's economy, but
also in international politics. All three countries are members of the
G20, which has gained prominence in recent efforts to tackle the global
economic crisis.
Indonesia's basis for middle-power status stems from its success in
domestic political reform, in particular, the embracing of democracy by
its multiethnic, multireligious society.
In addition, by continuing to pose economic growth in the face of the
current global economic crisis, Indonesia is now in a better position to
confidently assert its independent status and active diplomacy on the
world stage.
In recent times, middle-power leadership has been advocated by academics
and foreign policymakers in Canada and Australia to fill in the power
vacuum left after the end of the Cold War.
However, the notion itself dates back as far as the 15th century, when
Italian philosopher Giovanni Botero described "middle powers" as states
possessing "sufficient strength and authority to stand on their own
without the need of help from others".
Of course, in today's globalized world, it is difficult to imagine a
country surviving in complete isolation and autarky. Nonetheless, the
spirit of Botero's definition remains true in that middle powers
constitute countries that have a recognized prominent place within the
international system.
Some define middle powers as countries whose material capabilities, such
as military and economic powers, are neither great nor small, yet which
seek to bolster international institutions as a means to manage power
relations.
In addition, middle power leadership is defined by a country's political
clout within a region or sub-region, as well as its ability to show
expertise and push forward particular issues that are of interest to the
international community.
Therefore, the strength of middle powers draw not only on their actual
material capabilities, but also their geographical positioning vis-*-vis
other countries and functional status in international relations.
Based on such criteria, Indonesia fits nicely into the category of a
middle power. Although Indonesia may not be as powerful as some great
powers, it cannot be equaled to smaller countries in the international
community.
At the same time, while recognizing Indonesia's middle-power material,
it is important to stress that having a "middle-sized" economy and/or a
"middle-sized" military does not necessarily translate to Indonesia
legitimately calling itself a middle power.
To be regarded as such and to make middle-power status actually mean
something, Indonesia needs to "act" like a middle power. In other words,
the existence of a middle power is defined by its essence - Indonesia is
a middle power only if it engages the world actively.
The question remaining is thus why should we need to "brand" our foreign
policy and diplomacy as that of a middle power? The concern is that by
branding Indonesia's role in international affairs as such, we would
confine ourselves to a box, limiting our ability to maneuver not only in
pursuit of our national interests, but also the general interest of the
international community.
Others may argue that by being a middle power, Indonesia would relegate
itself to inferiority. At the same time, a middle-power status would
distinguish Indonesia from smaller powers, thus alienating it from
countries whose interest in Indonesia is supposedly represented in the
international arena.
All things considered, however, branding is important in identity
building. To generate a new identity for Indonesia's post-Cold War,
post-reform foreign policy and diplomacy, it is essential that some
level of branding be used in its approach to the world.
To brand itself as middle power does not constitute subservience to the
politics of great powers. Instead, it should be seen as a humble
recognition of Indonesia's limitations, and that despite these
limitations, Indonesia is determined to play an active role in pushing
for change and progress in the world. Also, far from alienating itself
from the developing world, a middle-power status ensures Indonesia has
role in mediating and linking the small and great world powers.
In his speech at Harvard University, President Susilo Bambang Yu-dhoyono
proclaimed the 21st Century was "the century of soft power", outlining
"Nine Imperatives" in creating the world anew through soft power.
As a middle power, and lacking the economic and military capacity to
exert hard power, it is through middle-power leadership (using
soft-power means) that Indonesia's foreign policy and diplomacy can
achieve greater success. And President Yudhoyono has opened the path
towards this very role for Indonesia in the years to come. (The Jakarta
Post)
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